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Environmental and Ecological Justice 
Chukwumerije Okereke and Mark Charlesworth 
Introduction 
Justice is a central theme in international environmental politics (IEP). In fact, one of the 
most distinctive contributions of IEP to the broader International Relations (IR) scholarship 
and discourse is arguably the firm insertion and elevation of questions of distributive justice. 
It is broadly accepted that justice occupies a central position in Western moral political 
philosophy. Hume (1975) described justice as the most important virtue of social relations 
and political institutions. St Augustine (1467/2003: 139) considered that the very legitimacy 
of a state lays on its claim to do justice. Rawls (1971) argued that any political institution 
deserves to be abolished if found to be unjust, because ‘justice’, he says, ‘is the first virtue of 
social institutions’ (3) and the ‘rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining 
or the calculus of social interest’ (5). Aristotle (1874/1998) regarded justice as co-extensive 
with virtue and therefore as the greatest of all virtues. ‘In justice’, he said, ‘every virtue is 
comprehended’. 
Despite the centrality of justice in political institutions and its potency as a ‘tool for 
social political mobilization’ (Okereke, 2008a: 32), IR scholarship has traditionally (and even 
now to a degree) failed to accord adequate concern to questions of justice. The conventional 
wisdom is that justice, to the measure that it can, should be focused on relations among 
people within national political boundaries rather than rigorously applied to IR (Caney, 
2001). 
However, from the contestations about fair distribution of putative proceeds from the 
exploitation of mineral resources in the seabed in the UN Third Law of the Sea (1967–1983), 
through disputes about how to balance between concerns for ecology and development 
(Stockholm and Rio), to current debates about how to share the burden of climate change, 
issues of equity and justice have certainly become one of the most contentious elements in 
the global sustainable development discourse. Yet, while the quest for environmental justice 
has played a central role in defining the character of international environmental rule-making 
over the last 30 years, these agitations have been generally less successful in upturning the 
fundamental structures and relationships that engender ecological degradation and 
environmental injustice. 
There are at least three main reasons why justice is a very contentious and ‘slippery’ 
subject, especially in the context of IR. First, there are several dimensions of justice and the 
relationship between these aspects and frameworks for organizing the different dimensions 
are not always clear (Dobson, 1998). Notable aspects include distributional justice, which 
focuses on outcomes; procedural justice, which emphasizes how decisions are made; and 
compensatory justice, which is concerned with how to calculate and offset the effect of 
historical injustice. Other dimensions include intergenerational justice, which concerns 
justice between present and future generations, and interspecies justice, which deals with 
justice between human and non-human beings. Furthermore, there are gender, individual, 
community, national, and international dimensions of justice (Beck, 2008; Caney, 2005; 
Clark, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Page, 2011; Roberts and Parks, 2007; Skinner, 2011). The 
multiplicity of visions of an ecologically just world and the diverse array of voices and 
emphasis often raise the legitimate question of whether in fact it is ‘possible to identify a 
single paradigm of environmental justice based on a common set of arguments’ (Conca et al., 
1995: 279). In fact, as we shall see below there are those who suggest making a distinction 
between environmental and ecological justice. 
A second and related challenge is that despite the elegant definition proposed by 
Aristotle (1874/1998), – ‘justice is giving to each their due’ – it is still very difficult, even 
with the best effort, to decide what justice should look like in practice. The simple reason is 
that there are many different ways of deciding what is due to people, which correspond 
roughly to different conceptions of justice. Notable formulations include (1) advocacy of 
Equality of resource, of income, or of opportunity; (2) desert – for example, distribution on 
the basis of effort and/or merit; (3) need – distribution on the basis of need; (4) fairness – for 
example, behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance or following ‘The Golden Rule’, which has 
versions in all societies, including ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’; (5) 
property rights; and (6) utility or welfare maximization which emphasizes distribution to 
achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Furthermore, not only does 
each of these conceptions of justice command decent ancestry and strong adherents, making 
any reconciliation difficult; most are developed in the context of national politics and 
transposing the core arguments to the international context is fraught with conceptual and 
practical difficulties. Hence, in many cases, any statement to the effect that one is interested 
in environmental justice immediately invites a riposte, ‘which justice?’ (see Dobson, 1998: 
5). 
A third major challenge is that IR, both in theory and practice, has developed in ways 
that tend to endorse the centrality of anarchy and self-interest. This development, alongside 
the weakness of institutions for addressing cross-border justice, often conspires to dampen 
even the best efforts to insert equity and justice in global (environmental) politics (Hurrell, 
2001). 
This chapter traces the evolution of key debates on international environmental justice 
and suggests important research frontiers. Although practical actions are yet to catch up with 
rhetoric, it is impressive that questions of ethics and justice can no longer be regarded as 
external or marginal concerns in global environmental governance (Biermann, this volume). 
The next section gives an orientation to questions of justice, the environment, and IR, 
before the following sections look in some detail at more specific facets of these questions; 
specifically, justice and deep ecology, social ecology, ‘empty-belly’ environmentalism, 
intergenerational justice and procedural justice, before climate change is used as a case study 
to illustrate some of these aspects. 
Environmentalism, justice and IR 
Ideas about justice in one form or another have always been a feature of international politics. 
A world vision of justice and peace is at the heart of idealism as an IR theory (Bull, 1983; 
Viotti and Kauppi, 2011) and the establishment of key international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Pogge, 2001). Also the 
quest for justice underpins much of the anti-slavery, anti-colonization, and anti-apartheid 
movements in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively (Bull, 1983; Nelson, 1974). However, 
to a large extent these concerns were muffled by the two World Wars and the dominance of 
realism which emphasizes power and relative self-interest as the key principles in IR. 
Moreover, the claims for justice as expressed in these movements were more about rights to 
self-determination than distributional in nature (Beitz, 1999; Nagel, 2005). 
Moral theories of IR were revived in the 1970s through the works of English School 
scholars like Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan, and Martin Wright, as well as through the writings of 
international political theorists such as Charles Beitz and Chris Brown. However, these 
theoretical endeavors quickly succumbed to revolutionary changes in global economic 
structures (Beitz, 1999: 515) and the dominant influence of liberal institutionalism, which 
emphasized the centrality of national economic interests, interdependence, and regime 
complexes in IR (Keohane, 1984; Viotti and Kauppi, 2011). 
But while popular Western IR theorizing was dominated by power and self-interested 
assumptions, the vision of a more solidarist international society that incorporates adequate 
concerns for social justice remained strong in countries from the global south who had in the 
early 1960s set up the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (G77) to protest against 
prevailing global political systems of domination and to promote a more equitable 
international order (Willetts, 1978; Geldart and Lyon, 1980; Salter et al., 1993). It is therefore 
not surprising that as environmental issues gained ascendancy as a major topic for 
international cooperation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, developing countries wasted no 
opportunity to articulate ‘clear and coherent reasons why the North stood to gain by 
discriminating in their favour’ (Parks and Roberts, 2006: 331) regarding ‘arguments about 
how responses to global environmental problems can be legitimized’ (Paterson, this volume). 
Although, as stated, concern for a just and more equitable international order has been 
a dominant theme in developing countries’ approach to IR, they enjoyed more success with 
environmental issues for at least three reasons (cf. Okereke, 2008b). Firstly, environmental 
problems provoked a unique sense of urgency for international cooperation because they 
highlighted the close interdependence of humankind as well as our dependence on a single 
natural world regardless of national boundaries and geographies (Sachs, 1993, 1999). 
Critically, they highlighted the limited nature of political boundaries as causes and receptors 
of environmental pollution. Second, environmental issues created a heightened sense of 
vulnerability among the rich countries, and with that a sense of urgent need for global action 
(Beck, 1992, 1999). Thirdly, scholarly works like Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) and Limits to 
Growth (Meadows, et al., 1972) plus major environmental disasters, such as the Bhopal gas-
leak tragedy in India which killed over 3,000 people and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
disaster which affected millions, created a favorable ‘normative temper’ (Okereke, 2008b) for 
questions of justice in the international realm. 
A particularly important set of events that helped to amplify and create a favorable 
‘moment’ for International Environmental Justice (IEJ) was the anti-toxic waste dump 
movement in the United States (Bullard, 1983; Bryant and Mohai, 1992). The anti-toxic 
campaigns which started as a protest to block the dumping of contaminated soil in a poor and 
black-dominated area in North Carolina (Schlosberg, 2007: 47) soon broadened to include 
unequal exposure by class, race, and ethnicity. In addition to inspiring a wave of literature on 
the concept of environmental justice, the anti-toxic movement also produced emotive terms 
such as ‘environmental racism’, ‘environmental genocide’, ‘toxic racism’, and other 
vocabularies which provided important rhetorical devices and mobilization tools in the 
campaign for international environmental justice. In fact, from this time on, IEJ and questions 
of environmental justice at national levels were viewed as conceptually linked and resultant 
of the same systems of domination operating across different scales (Byrne et al., 2007; 
Conca et al., 1995; Elliott, 1998; Okereke, 2011). 
As noted, environmental justice is far from being a unified or unifying concept. Right 
from the outset, the notion of environmentalism and its relationship with social justice has 
always been a hotly contested subject. It was not long after environmentalism became 
mainstream that various ‘shades’ of green movements or environmentalism were identified in 
scholarly literature and public discourse. To give just a limited view, O’Riordan in 1977 
distinguished between ‘conservative ecocentric’ and ‘liberal ecocentric’ ideologies, and again 
in 1981 he made a distinction between ‘ecocentric’ and ‘technocentic’ modes of 
environmentalism. Sandbach (1980) differentiates between ‘functionalist’ and ‘Marxist’ 
environmentalism. Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1973) espoused a deep ecology 
philosophy which he set against the so called shallow ecology. Dobson’s (1998) typology 
distilled four different types of environmentalism, including ‘very weak sustainability’, ‘weak 
sustainability’, ‘strong sustainability’, and ‘very strong sustainability’. For Dobson, these four 
categories correspond to four environmental philosophies: Cornucopia, Accommodating, 
Communalism, and Deep Ecology. A provocative treatment by Guha and Martinez-Alier 
(1997) distinguishes between the ‘full-stomach’ environmentalism of the North and the 
‘empty-belly’ environmentalism of the South. Paterson (2000) writing from an IR perspective 
separates between six categories, including liberal environmentalism, realism, 
ecoauthoritarianism, ecosocialism, social ecology and deep ecology. 
Critically, these shades of green do not simply reflect varying emphasis on what is the 
most important aspect of environmentalism; rather many reflect fundamental (and sometimes 
irreconcilable) differences about worldview, and about the cause and solutions for global 
environmental problems (Dobson, 1998). In the following sections, we will trace the 
evolution of these ideas and their impact on IEP. A historical account is necessary because an 
understanding of how things came to be is often essential in comprehending the options for, 
and barriers against, achieving desired change (see also Stevis, this volume). As Pepper 
(1984) puts it,  
if we seek for the future the kind of real social and environmental changes which 
much of the standard environmental literature calls for, … then we must develop an 
historical perspective of how we and others have arrived at our present set of 
attitudes and understand what material changes will be needed to help foster a new 
one. (3) 
For the sake of simplicity, we will limit ourselves to four broad categorizations and prevalent 
ideologies – all of which are mainly concerned with distributional aspects of justice. These 
are deep ecology, social ecology, ‘empty-belly’ environmentalism, and intergenerational 
justice. Subsequently, we will briefly discuss procedural justice, which is one distinct form of 
justice that has enjoyed a rise in recent times. Next, we will use the case of climate change to 
provide more practical illustration before making some concluding remarks. 
Deep ecology, justice and IR 
The notion of deep ecology as a concept and philosophical tradition has its roots in the life 
and works of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. In a seminal article in 1973, Naess 
criticized what he called the ‘shallow range ecological movement’, which he said was the 
prevailing ecological moment of the time. He argued that although powerful and influential, 
shallow ecology was very limited and in some cases outright dangerous. It was limited 
because it has as its central focus the fight against pollution and resource depletion, with the 
central motif being mainly the preservation of the health and affluence of people from the 
industrialized countries of the world. The shallowness of the movement lies, he argues, in its 
failure to grasp the deeper and intimate connection between man and nature. For Naess, 
shallow ecology can be outright dangerous because while purporting to recognize the 
importance of ecological thinking, policies inspired by this approach are not holistic but often 
result in displacing environmental harm, increasing the prices of life’s necessities, increasing 
class divisions, and privileging economic growth over nature conservation. In short, then, this 
type of ecology is nothing but another form of utilitarian pragmatism by Western 
governments and businesses. Naess argued for a movement away from shallow ecology to 
deep ecology. 
Deep ecology, according to Naess, recognizes the intimate interdependence between 
humankind and their ecology. The central claim is that humans are part of nature and not 
separate from it. Equally central is the notion that nature has an intrinsic or inherent value 
that is not based on its instrumental utility to humans. In fact, it advocates the doctrine of 
‘biospherical egalitarianism’ (Naess, 1973: 95), which suggests that human beings and living 
nature each have equal right to life. Deep ecology rejects the domination of humans over 
nature to satisfy human wants, but rather presses the claim that humans have equivalent or at 
least near equivalent worth to nature. Following, it is suggested that a ‘deep-seated respect 
[for nature], or even veneration’ (Naess, 1973: 95) is required preferably from all, and most 
certainly from ecologists. Naess argues that deep ecology warrants a deeper recognition of 
the complexity of the world and a search for whole person and whole system solutions. 
Although Naess is often linked to Buddhism because of his profession of Ghandian 
non-violence, it is in fact the case that his philosophy has a long and rich Western ancestry. In 
particular, his idea of deep ecology has close parallels with the writing and philosophy of 
many 20th-century Western ecologists, especially Aldo Leopold, the close friend and adviser 
to US President Theodore Roosevelt (Bowler, 1992). Leopold had in his book, A Sand 
County Almanac (2001), advocated a ‘Land Ethic’, which is based on the claim that humanity 
and all other beings are aspects of a single unfolding reality/community. Deep ecologists 
would tend to support Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’: ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ 
(Leopold, 2001: 189). According to Bowler (1992), Leopold’s views and his influence on 
Roosevelt were very much instrumental to the establishment of the first wave of nature and 
game reserves in the United States and other parts of Europe. 
What, though, is the connection between deep ecology and justice? To be sure, Naess 
did not use the term ‘justice’ in his seminal article setting out the key tenets of deep ecology. 
In fact, the term ‘ecological justice’ was apparently coined by Low and Gleeson as recently 
as 1998, though Conca et al. (1995) indicated the term. However, it is obvious that the deep 
ecology movement as elucidated by Naess has strong implications for justice both nationally 
and internationally. The rejection of human supremacy over nature or a domineering posture 
against nature is certainly at the heart of the idea of interspecies justice, which has been a key 
dimension of environmental ethics (Agar, 1997; Alder and Wilkinson, 1999; Brennan, 2003). 
A number of different broad arguments are used by philosophers to advance the claim for 
non-anthropocentric environmental ethics and to assert that non-human things are supposed 
to be included as subjects for justice (Baxter, 2005; Schlosberg, 2007). The first is the 
consequentialist approach, which draws mainly from utilitarianism and suggests that non-
human things, especially those that can experience pain and pleasure, should be included in 
the community of justice (Regan, 1987; Singer, 1975). The notion that non-human things 
have intrinsic value and are deserving of justice consideration is the philosophical backbone 
for the animal rights movement, which has had considerable influence in relevant legislation 
and praxis in the Western democracies. The second is the deontological approach, the basic 
argument of which is that it is morally perverse for humans to destroy or dominate what they 
have not and cannot create (Alder and Wilkinson, 1999). Another strand is to argue that it is 
the whole biotic community (rather than individual species) that constitutes the community of 
justice (Callicott, 1989; cf. Leopold, 2001). The third approach is virtue, which emphasizes 
the role of ethical behavior such as moderation and prudence (Aristotle, 1874; MacIntyre, 
1984). While deep ecology’s main contribution to equity is seen to lie in the realm of 
interspecies justice, it should be pointed out that the philosophy also has implications for 
social justice at national and international levels. For example, Naess clearly identified 
egalitarianism and classlessness as key concerns for deep ecology. He wrote about the need 
to encourage diversity globally and promote an ‘anti-class posture’ both within and between 
nations. Moreover, his preference for local autonomy and decentralization both for 
production and, to the extent possible, for adequate political coordination has far-reaching 
implications for current globalized political and economic structures (see Byrne et al., 2007). 
It is hard to argue that deep ecology does not embody a concern for justice. 
Nevertheless, deep ecology has been criticized precisely for failing to give adequate 
consideration to social justice at both the national and international levels. The most popular 
critique is arguably the one launched by Bookchin in his work, ‘Social Ecology versus Deep 
Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement’ (1987). Here, Bookchin criticizes deep 
ecology for paying too much attention to justice for nature while ignoring issues of social 
justice. He argues that deep ecology is in error for failing to recognize that ecological 
degradation was ultimately a reflection and manifestation of unequal and hierarchical social 
relations. 
Another main strand of criticism which comes mostly from scholars from the South is 
the accusation that deep ecology stems from Western romanticism of nature and fails to 
adequately address questions of social justice, especially between rich and poor countries. 
Southern scholars point out that international environmental cooperation has not developed 
with adequate concern for distributive justice (Kiss, 1985; Okereke, 2008a). They argue that 
the focus has been more on conservation of endangered non-human species and less on 
distributive justice. Here it is frequently pointed out that the first set of international 
environmental agreements such as the Antarctic Treaty System (1959), the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands (1971), the London Convention on Dumping at Sea (1972), and the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979) have all been 
about conservation and less about human welfare. The argument is that attention to 
conservation masks the asymmetrical distribution of environmental benefits and burdens 
across nations. It is fair to say that while in principle deep ecology has radical implications for 
justice at national and international levels, the attention of the key proponents has been more 
on justice between human beings and nature. Deep ecology has important influence in the 
emergence and philosophy of some of the most globally influential non-governmental 
environmental organizations like WWF, IUCN, and Greenpeace (Bowler, 1992). These 
organizations had tremendous influence in bringing many environmental issues into the 
international agenda and some even took positions that had important consequence for justice 
(Betsill, this volume). However, these organizations have been criticized for not giving 
adequate attention to social justice, especially in relation to their support of programs such as 
debt for nature swaps, which tend to privilege biodiversity conservation over human welfare 
(Hamlin, 1989; Knicley, 2012). Deep ecology sentiments are still strong in the discourse and 
international environmental policymaking circles. Organizations such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth frequently attend important international conferences on environment to 
campaign for nature-centered views on policymaking. However, it is fair to say that for the 
most part their philosophy has shifted significantly from deep ecology sentiments to more of 
‘shallow ecology’ or what Steven Bernstein (2001) calls ‘liberal environmentalism’. 
Social ecology, justice, and IR 
Social ecology presses the claim that ecological problems are rooted in social problems and 
especially the social relations of hierarchy and domination (see also Detraz, this volume). 
Founded by green author and activist Murray Bookchin, the philosophy espouses the belief 
that it is impossible to address the world’s ecological problems unless one fully recognizes 
that these problems are symptomatic of unequal social relations. Although critical of all 
forms of hierarchical relations (for example, gender, race), social ecology singles out class-
based capitalism as the ultimate and most ecologically destructive form of hierarchical 
relations. Bookchin argues that capitalism pits man against man and results in the conversion 
of community relations to impersonal market relations where people are basically treated as 
commodities. The same logic results in various aspects of nature being treated as 
commodities that need to be exploited for instrumental reasons, especially market profit. 
Social ecology presses the claim for the need for more community, equality, and diversity. 
Like deep ecology, it argues for humanity to better recognize its relationship with nature; that 
is, recognize its place within as opposed to outside nature. Social ecology is very critical of 
solutions to ecological problems rooted in market transactions, such as green or ethical 
consumerism. It is suggested that such schemes mask the fundamental changes in structure of 
production that are required to achieve lasting ecological integrity. It argues for more 
decentralization and for democratic participation. Bookchin envisioned a post-capitalist 
society characterized by greater diversity, natural abundance, and participatory democracy, 
all of which he says will be made possible by technology. 
As noted, social ecology is critical of deep ecology for focusing attention on humans’ 
domination of nature and less on humans’ domination over one another. Yet these traditions 
have far more in common than first meets the eye. Both believe in decentralization; both are 
against instrumental approaches to environmental conservation; both are critical of 
capitalism; and both believe in the need for greater diversity and equality. However, despite 
giving more explicit emphasis to unequal social relations in its thesis, social ecology does not 
dwell to any appreciable degree on international environmental justice. Bookchin’s focus, 
like those after him, has been at the national level. Hence, it is subject to the same critique 
that Southern scholars make against deep ecology. 
There is evidence that the philosophy of social ecology had at least indirect effect in 
promoting the quest for international environmental justice. For one, it certainly provided 
philosophical impetus for the campaign against environmental injustice that swept through 
the United States in the 1980s. However, given perhaps its focus on the national level, the 
influence of social ecology as a philosophy on IEP has been very limited. 
‘Empty-belly’ environmentalism, justice and IR 
By far the strongest source of agitation for international environmental justice has come from 
what Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) describe as the ‘empty-belly’ environmentalism of 
developing country citizens and their political leaders. This environmental ‘movement’ has 
thrown up all sorts of difficult questions and made a serious impact on the direction and 
character of IR over recent years. As a result of this movement, it has now become almost 
unthinkable that any serious account of international relations will ignore the moral and 
ethical dimensions of international relations. Unlike deep and social ecology, both of which 
have as their focus social and ecological relations at the national level, the focus of ‘empty-
belly’ environmentalism is squarely at the international level and in short the relationship 
between developed and developing countries. Although a coherent philosophical treatment is 
still lacking, agitation for international environmental justice by the South is based closely on 
three thematic rationales. These are discussed in the following. 
Unequal access to natural resources between the North and South 
Current and historical political economy structures mean that resources tend to be more 
readily available to Northern citizens and companies than those in countries with lower per 
capita income – typically in the South. Examples include energy, minerals, food, medicine, 
and clean water. The reasons for this situation are complex but certainly include historical 
factors such as colonialism and associated domination, exploitation, and abuses of power. 
The historical overuse of ‘global commons’ by the North 
It is often asserted (for example, WCED, 1987) that the atmosphere, deep oceans, and 
geosynchronous orbital space required for telecommunications satellites should be considered 
global commons that are not and cannot be owned by individuals or nations. In each case in 
the last few hundred years, Western nations have made more use of these resources than other 
nations with the vast majority of the benefits accruing. The clearest example is the emission 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, to which we return 
later in the chapter. Other examples include industrial whaling, fishing, exploitation of 
biological resources, and waste dumping in the oceans. 
Externalization of environmental risk by the North 
It is generally agreed that the risks associated with climate change caused by GHGs will fall 
principally on the poor in the South. A similar transfer of environmental risks is the 
movement of hazardous waste from North to South, which continues despite the Basel 
Convention (Okereke, 2008a). 
In addition to the above, emphasis on the quality of participation in international 
environmental decision-making has grown in recent years, leading many commentators to 
focus on procedural equity as a separate dimension of justice which deserves close attention 
in the context of IEP. We provide a brief treatment later in the chapter. 
Intergenerational justice and environmental 
relations 
The fourth dimension of distributional justice that has exerted important influence on the 
discourse of IEP is intergenerational justice. This is justice between present and future (as 
well as past) generations. The Brundtland report defines sustainable development as 
development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987: 53). This definition is an explicit 
endorsement that the idea of intergenerational justice is central to the notion of global 
sustainability. A number of popular maxims in the sustainable community also support the 
idea of intergenerational justice. One example is the famous Native American saying: ‘Treat 
the earth well: it was not given to you by your parents, it was loaned to you by your children.’ 
However, while intergenerational environmental justice may have a powerful intuitive 
appeal, providing a robust philosophical justification of why unborn people should be 
considered a legitimate subject of justice is not easy (Page, 2007: 54). Perhaps the best-
known philosophical argument for attempting to establish the claim of intergenerational 
environmental justice is the indirect reciprocity thesis, which owes much to the work of Brian 
Barry (Barry, 1989; see Page 2007; Gosseries, 2006, 2008). Here the main argument is that 
the current generation owes something to the next generation because it received something 
from the previous one. In other words, because we received something from our parents we 
are obligated to pass the same ‘in return’ to our children. On this frame, justice also demands 
that the current generation must pass on to the next capital at least equivalent to what it 
inherited from the previous one, so that later generations should never ‘be left worse off’ 
(Barry, 1989: 159). One serious problem with this formulation however relates to the exact 
content of the capital that ought to be bequeathed to future generations – that is, whether it 
refers to natural resources, man-made resources, welfare, or social and technological 
capabilities. A related controversy is about whether these resources are commensurable and 
perfectly substitutable. In other words, is it fair for the present generation to exhaust resource 
X and compensate a future generation by leaving an abundance of resource Y? Some others 
reject the notion that future generations have rights and can be a legitimate community of 
justice on the ground that people yet unborn do not have identity and ‘cannot now, therefore, 
be the present bearer or subject of anything including rights’ (De George, 1981: 161). 
Gosseries (2006, 2008) and Page (2006, 2007) among others have provided extensive 
treatments to show that considerations of justice across generations are implicated in 
important environmental policies, such as defining the level of a global cap on GHG 
emissions, deciding an emission reduction trajectory over time, justifying the preservation of 
biodiversity, conservation of species, setting a moratorium on whaling, and so on. This may 
well be the case. In fact as stated, leaving behind a decent planet for future generations 
constitutes a central tenet and impetus for environmental sustainability. However, it is less 
clear that this intuition is best cast in terms of justice or that such considerations are overly 
significant in international environmental decision-making quarters. 
Procedural environmental justice and IR 
The question of who has the power to participate and shape decisions has become 
increasingly crucial in global environmental governance literature (Auer, 2002; Betsill, this 
volume; Bulkeley and Mol, 2003; Clapp, 1998; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Najam, 2005). 
Although many comprehensive theories of justice include procedure and outcome 
(Miller, 1999; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971), there is a growing tendency by commentators to 
give specific attention to procedural justice as an independent aspect of fairness in 
environmental politics (Adger et al., 2003; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Paavola, 2005; Shrader-
Frechette, 2002). Ceva (2012) for one argues that fairness of governance systems and 
corresponding equity in participation should be a legitimate focus of justice and moral 
scrutiny independent of the outcomes of such systems. He contends that questions about the 
principles and fairness of participation remain expedient even where a governance system 
appears to produce just decisions and outcomes. Barry (1965) stressed the need to distinguish 
between fairness in the rules of participation and ‘background fairness’ where emphasis is on 
making sure that all parties have equal opportunity to participate under the set rules. This 
distinction is very crucial as will become evident below. 
The United Nations and many international environmental regimes have elaborate 
rules of procedure which are often rigorously debated, suggesting states are mindful of the 
need for procedural justice. However, much of the focus appears to be on rules of process 
with little clarification of intended outcomes. Moreover, the huge asymmetry in numbers, 
technical, language, and informational capabilities, among other factors, all but makes a joke 
of this formal attempt to secure procedural justice defined narrowly as being present in 
meetings (see Najam, 2005; Roberts and Parks, 2007). Table 13.1 presents a head count of 
the number of delegates from select developed and developing countries (based on 
comparable populations) that attended the annual UN climate change meetings. 
Table 13.1 Headcount of delegates from various countries who attended annual UN climate 
change meetings 
 Chad 
11.2m  
Germany 
81.8  
Ethiopia 
82.1m  
UK 
62.4m  
DR of 
Congo 
65.9  
Brazil 
190m  
Nigeria 
160m  
Canada 
34m  
Algeria 
36m  
Japan 
127m  
2000  2  75  5  41  2  66  15  81  8  69  
2001  2  56  3  37  2  40  19  46  8  98  
2002  2  54  3  43  2  30  8  54  6  73  
2003  1  62  0  38  2  55  13  66  14  76  
2004  1  46  2  47  6  207  18  71  13  81  
2005  1  48  2  83  7  34  9  371  11  70  
2006  1  45  0  40  3  15  7  48  1  39  
2007  5  101  2  64  9  196  31  61  8  75  
2008  2  57  2  42  2  17  11  33  2  54  
2009  2  31  7  22  7  34  27  24  11  55  
2010  10  110  28  75  58  736  83  93  27  135  
           
Note: Lead Author’s head count from UNFCCC attendance register from 
unfccc.int/resource/docs 
One quickly sees that even when huge technical advantages are discounted, the sheer 
numerical advantage of industrialized countries in these meetings leaves poor countries 
absolutely little or no chance to exert significant influence in decision-making. It should be 
noted that considerations of procedural justice in IEP extend beyond the balance of power 
and participation between developed and developing countries. Concerns have been raised 
about the extent to which states truly represent the various segments, interests, and 
communities that constitute them (Bäckstrand, 2003; Wapner, 1995, 1996). The lack of 
representativeness of states in IEP has also been voiced with particular reference to the 
interests of indigenous communities (Bäckstrand, 2006; Dove, 2006; Lane and Corbet, 2005). 
Other accounts have highlighted the need for gender balance in both national and 
international environmental governance (Bretherton, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2004; Detraz, this 
volume). In fact, one aspect of procedural injustice often identified in the literature is that 
while individuals, communities, and states alike have the ability to affect or be affected by 
environmental challenges, the legitimacy to decide solutions remains almost exclusively the 
preserve of nation-states (or more specifically, a few state-representing elites). In defense of 
the need to democratize global environmental spaces, some have suggested formal space 
should be created for transnational NGOs and subnational organizations such as cities to have 
greater say in global environmental decision-making (Bäckstrand, 2004, 2006; Cashore, 
2002; Wapner, 2006, 2007; see also Betsill, this volume). 
At the same time some have questioned the rationale for opening up international 
institutions to community groups, NGOs, and the like when these entities might themselves 
be in dire need of democratization (Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005; Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000). Still 
others have questioned the justice of according equal vote to countries like the United States 
and Chad despite the huge difference in their population (Leech, 2002). There are no easy 
answers. However, questions about how best to democratize or achieve greater procedural 
justice in global environmental decision-making systems remains a priority in both 
theoretical and empirical terms (Farber, 2007; Tol, and Verheyen, 2004). 
Case study: climate change 
Climate change is a very good example for illustrating the role of justice in IEP and in 
particular the potential and limits of justice in global environmental governance. Although, as 
noted, demands for justice in global environmental rule-making have a fairly long history, 
climate change has provided the space and platform for the ‘loudest’ articulation of the need 
for justice in IEP in both policy and academic circles. In fact, it is fair to say that 
contestations for justice have been one, if not the most, defining feature of global climate 
policy since 1992. 
There are at least two main reasons that account for the high-profile role of equity (a 
specific concern of justice) and justice (a broad term that typically has legal, political, and 
moral aspects) in global climate policy. The first is that climate change is implicated in 
fundamental developmental activities of all nations; thus the rules and policies adopted (or 
not) in addressing the challenge are bound to have serious consequences for the economy of 
nations. The second and related point is that climate change, with its massive negative 
impacts on natural, human, and social systems, has the ability to fundamentally alter the 
development path or options of many countries, especially those in the poorer regions of the 
world. In fact, for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa as well as several small island 
countries, climate change is an existential threat – holding out the possibility of forcing the 
entire country to relocate to new political territories (Biermann and Boas, 2010; Myers, 
2002). These reasons are further amplified because of the huge asymmetry in contribution, 
impact, and decision-making abilities within and between countries. 
In terms of impact, the vast proportion of the negative effects of climate change will 
be borne by the world populations that have least contributed to the problem. The implication 
is that climate change is essentially a case of the rich imposing their risks on the poor. 
Beyond that current decision-making processes and power structures mean that rich countries 
have advantages over poorer countries in the rather convoluted and complex process of 
deciding how to tackle the problem of climate change. This creates a distinct possibility that 
those responsible for the problem can use their decision powers to approve rules that further 
exacerbate their advantages. 
In extant scholarship, several dimensions of justice in the context of climate change 
have been articulated (Adger, et al., 2006; Gardiner, 2004; Grasso, 2007; Page, 2007; 
Okereke and Schroeder, 2009). This ranges from two broad categories – justice in mitigation 
and adaptation – to ‘ten layers’ of justice as proposed by Parks and Roberts (2006). In our 
view, there are at least five practical justice challenges to which any global climate policy 
must respond. These include the following: 
<list> 
(i) Justice in mitigation: Given the vast asymmetry in contribution to climate change 
between nations in both historical and current terms, plus the urgent need for drastic emission 
reductions, as indicated by climate science, how should the burden sharing for climate 
mitigation be best distributed within and between nations (Adger, 2001; Müller, 2001; 
Thomas and Twyman, 2005)? 
(ii) Justice in adaptation: Given that the vast proportion of the negative impacts of climate 
change will be on the people who have contributed least to the problem, what is the most just 
way for distributing the limited finance and capacity for helping vulnerable communities and 
countries adapt, plus how should the cost for adaption be distributed within and between 
countries (Adger, 2001; Adger et al., 2006; Thomas and Twyman, 2005)? 
(iii) Justice in procedure: Given the huge asymmetry in decision-making power within and 
between countries, what are just ways of ensuring effective participation in climate 
negotiation processes? Critically, how can the notion of effective participation be made 
applicable across scales of geography from communities, through states, to world regions 
(Thomas and Twyman, 2005; Adger et al., 2006; Vanderheiden, 2008)? 
(iv) Justice in compensation: Given that climate change is already having devastating 
impacts on the lives and development paths of many countries, especially in the poor South, 
what are just ways of calculating and providing adequate compensation for the victims of 
climate change (Farber, 2007; Smit and Skinner, 2002; Tol and Verheyen, 2004)? 
(v) Justice in background political structures: Given that the asymmetries implicated in 
climate change (contribution, impact, ability to participate, and so on) are only symptomatic 
of broader and deeper structural inequities, what are just ways to address the deep causes of 
these fundamental inequities, in a bid to create a fairer world (Shue, 1992; Okereke, 
2011)?</list> 
In practice, these questions have been a regular feature of the climate regime since its 
inception in 1992. There is every indication that they will continue to dominate the effort to 
find a replacement for the new climate regime that will replace the Kyoto protocol in 2015. 
In light of the above, the question then is what, if any, has been the role of the 
different environmental justice philosophies/movements in the development of the global 
climate regime? It is probably fair to say that deep ecology ideas are barely considered in 
climate policy. It is true that the target of climate stabilization is often discussed in the 
context of preventing irreversible damage to the natural ecosystem. However, what 
instrumental benefits humans can get from nature and threats to these benefits have almost 
exclusively been the concern. Thus any ‘justice’ – even gratitude as part of right relationship 
(cf. Barry, 1999: 263) – that might be owed to aspects of nature is barely considered in 
practice. More social aspects of deep ecology ideas, such as implications for social class, do 
have some consideration in climate change policy and discussions, if not explicitly labeled as 
such. 
Similarly, social ecology has had little explicit impact on climate policy. There is 
growing recognition that the climate problem has an intimate link with prevailing class-based 
capitalist structures and that the most vulnerable to climate change are those at the bottom of 
the ladder in the world capitalist structure. Despite this, however, the idea that the market and 
neoclassical development patterns provide the best way of addressing climate change remains 
extremely strong in policy and academic discourse. The central assumption is that climate 
represents nothing more than a market failure and that the best way to address it is to 
internalize the externalities and in so doing correct the inefficiencies that caused the problem. 
This explains why market instruments such as carbon taxes, emissions trading, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), rating and disclosure, joint implementation, and voluntary 
carbon offsets are by far the dominant instruments for addressing climate change. This 
practice barely considers the mounting scholarship, casting serious doubt on the efficiency 
and poor distributional impacts of these instruments (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009, 2011; 
Lohmann, 2009, 2010). 
Predictably, empty-belly ecology has had the most effect on climate policy. Right 
from the outset, developing countries resisted the attempt by the North to make climate 
change a matter of narrow discussion about the technical mitigation or sequestration of 
carbon. In an intense diplomatic effort led mostly by Brazil, China, and India, the South 
insisted that global efforts to address climate change must be put in the broader context of 
equitable international development. In fact, they argued that effort to address climate change 
must be seen as a tool for correcting fundamental injustice in global economic structures 
(Borione and Ripert, 1994; Dasgupta, 1994). It was through these efforts that concepts like 
North–South financial and technology transfer, per capita emissions, historical emissions, 
capacity building, and most notably the common but differentiated responsibility principle 
became very common vocabularies within the regime’s development circles. 
Yet, while there is evidence that the empty-belly ecology of the South has led to a 
very strong insertion of justice concerns in the climate regime, it is fair to say that actual 
practical policies aiming at achieving greater justice have at best had very marginal impact. 
The minimal evidence of such impact includes, firstly, the exclusion of the countries with 
historically low emissions from being required to undertake quantified emission reduction 
targets in the Kyoto regime. Secondly, there is the establishment of a climate adaption fund to 
help the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) deal with the negative impact of climate change. 
Thirdly, there is the CDM which provided opportunities for rich countries to make 
technological investments in developing countries in return for certified emission reduction 
(CER) credits. However, North–South transfers in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars 
originally envisaged from the outset of the global climate negotiations have not materialized 
(Grubb et al., 1991; Hayes, 1993). Nor has there been any radical change in the world 
capitalist and neoliberal system, which is responsible for climate destruction and Northern 
domination. 
Summary and conclusion 
Normative approaches to IEP have served to bring the ‘unavoidability of justice’ to 
mainstream scholarship and the forefront of global environmental policymaking. Concerted 
diplomatic effort and scholarship on this area have joined forces to overturn the notion that 
international politics is beyond the pale of morality and subject only to the calculus of 
egoistic and self-interested state actors. The impact of considerations of justice – deep 
ecology, social ecology, and most of all empty-belly ecological justice – litters the 
international environmental policy landscape. Yet, it remains the case that international 
diplomacy still tends in practice to support gains in wealth and power by those countries, 
companies, and individuals who already have power. Hence despite the central role of justice 
in international environmental policymaking and environmental studies scholarship, IR 
practice has so far failed to accord adequate concerns to questions of justice. As efforts to 
negotiate a new regime for climate change get under way, one of the interesting questions 
will be whether the new regime will build on the advances made or whether there will be 
significant regression. 
Each of the facets of justice discussed here will bear sustained efforts to be applied to 
environmental policy in general and climate policy in particular, as justice questions, if not 
solutions, are clear in this field. Perhaps the most important are considerations of formal 
international procedures that address empty-belly environmental justice questions in the 
context of difficulties predicting the climate system (Charlesworth and Okereke, 2010), in 
particular, by gathering weight of evidence of the distribution approaches to justice and 
environmental ethics questions globally. This appears likely to suggest that policy and 
international agreements should be less focused on imposing maximization of economic 
growth and more focused on allowing the wealthy to live simply so that the poor and future 
generations can simply live. There is already evidence to suggest that more people in the 
world support moderate consumption rather than humans eating ourselves out of heart and 
home. 
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